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五角大楼重返亚太决策(The Pentagon and the Pivot)

2015-01-21 知远战略与防务研究所 廖凯(Kai Liao)访问次数:

本文首发于Survival: Global Politics and Strategy杂志2013年6-7月刊,网址参见http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-2013-532b/55-3-10-liao-d59e

Chinese officials and analysts regard the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, despite Washington’s claim that it does not focus on a particular country. Instead of accepting either Chinese skepticism or US official statements at face value, this article attempts to trace the origins and examine the evolution of the pivot through the lens of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, the Office of Net Assessment (ONA).Drawing on documents produced and sponsored by the office, this article explores trends in its analysis of Asian security and Sino-American relations, the rationale for the pivot and China’s role in the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.
Established in 1973, the ONA is directed by Andrew W. Marshall and employs around 15 staff.1 Most of its projects are outsourced to external academics, think tanks and companies. The US Department of Defense defines net assessment as ‘the comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.’2 The ONA studies issues relevant to national security such as weapons technology and climate change, explores worst-case scenarios and promotes no-regret strategies. 3 Using methods such as war games, simulations, policy analysis and scenario-based planning, the office aims to anticipate strategic developments 20 years in advance.
Marshall was described by former US Vice President Dick Cheney as one of the world’s best strategists, and last year was ranked at number 44 in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers.4 Like many first-generation RAND scholars, Marshall is often praised for his originality, though he has also been criticised for making exaggerated claims.
This article is based on the study of ONA-related defence department documents and memoranda, the writings of officials and experts associated with the office and work by individuals and organisations it commissioned to carry out research. For brevity, I will not specify every aspect of the ONA’s relationship with the individuals and organisations quoted in this article. Generally, these sources influenced, or were influenced by, Marshall and the ONA. Those associated with the ONA will usually be referred to as net assessors. Although Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999 seemingly has no connection to the office, Marshall and Albert Wohlstetter were consulted on the drafting of the document.5 Zalmay Khalilzad and Abram N. Shulsky, major authors of the guidance, both have a background at RAND and are closely associated with Marshall and Wohlstetter. Shulsky also worked for the ONA, and was one of the participants in its 1999 Summer Study. This article examines ONA-related work since the 1980s.
I recognise the limitations of this approach. Firstly, there is no discussion of the degree to which US national-security policy has in fact been influenced by the office and the studies it sponsored. Secondly, some may categorise the ONA and its associated net assessors as neoconservatives, and argue that my sources reveal only certain neoconservative perspectives. However, instead of discussing ideology, this study treats the office as a channel through which experts from academic, non-governmental institutions influence national-security decision-making at the highest level. The underlying assumption is that examining ONA-related work will help us understand the world views of senior US officials and defence elites or, at least, tell us what interests the Pentagon’s internal think tank and, to some extent, the Defense Department. There is also an assumption that it will tell us what questions they asked at certain points in time and reveal, to a degree, the rationale for the pivot. In any case, if US officials and elites’ views of the security environment and the pivot are to be assessed, ONArelated work appears a good place to begin.
Cold War origins
As shown by various high-level strategy and national-security documents, the ONA’s work during the Cold War led to net assessment becoming the United States’ main analytical framework for understanding the global security environment and the competition with the USSR. The White House’s 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States argued that
the United States must pursue strategies for competition with the Soviets which emphasize our comparative advantages … Competitive strategies are aimed at exploiting our technological advantages in thoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets to compete less efficiently or less effectively in areas of military application. Such strategies seek to make portions of the tremendous Soviet military machine obsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not necessarily threaten our own forces.6
Some scholars and former officials argued that the ONA, alongside the Competitive Strategies Initiative created by Marshall, helped to perfect the containment strategy that contributed to the collapse of the USSR.7 As argued by Daniel I. Gouré, vice-president of the Lexington Institute, ‘the competitive strategies approach, particularly as applied by the Reagan administration, did much to set the stage for subsequent events and for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact’.8
The ONA continues to play an influential role in strategic assessment and defence planning. It is responsible for preparing the US defence secretary’s annual report to Congress, which contains a comprehensive net assessment ‘to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries’.9 The ONA’s work on the well-known concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has influenced strategists in many countries. The office is often involved in drafting and assessing national-security and defence-policy documents.
Many former ONA staff have held high-ranking positions at the Pentagon, think tanks, consulting companies, universities or military education centres. Taiwan and India have established their own offices of net assessment and the approach has heavily influenced Australian defence policy. According to Chen Zhou, the main author of four recent Chinese defence white papers, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Academy of Military Science also studies Marshall’s work.10
From its inception to around 2000, the ONA went through roughly three phases in assessing the global security environment and identifying potential challenges. Firstly, during the Cold War, it focused on long-term competition with the USSR. Secondly, in the aftermath of the Cold War, it worked to find the right direction for strategic orientation. Finally, from the mid-1990s to around 2000, the office began to fully realise the strategic importance of Asia and assess potential great-power competitors in the region. At the end of this phase, the office concluded that China would be the United States’ main strategic competitor in the next few decades.
During the ONA’s first phase of assessment, Asia was treated as a key balance area but regarded as being much less important than Europe. China appeared in its studies only on occasion and, when it did, was viewed in terms of its importance to competition with the USSR.11 In the mid-1980s, the ONA recognised that Asia was becoming more important. Drawing on a 1983 strategic-balance review, Marshall concluded that the United States was in a strong position and the Soviets’ capacity to wage global war was diminishing.12 This allowed the ONA to divert some of its resources to studying future security scenarios, such as the rise of Asia and the development of a multipolar world order. Consequently, in 1985 the office requested that the Science Applications International Corporation begin to study potential strategies and policies for use in such scenarios.13 The main findings of these studies were reflected in The Future Security Environment, a 1988 report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, led by Marshall and Charles Wolf, Jr, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. This report accurately identified several long-term trends, two of which are still highly relevant to the United States’ current strategic thinking and pivot towards Asia.
Firstly, the paper argued that the Soviets were correct in thinking technological development would lead to new forms of military organization and operational concepts that would fundamentally change the nature of warfare. Secondly, Marshall and Wolf predicted that the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries would increase their military spending, shifting the balance of power in a way that could affect US security.14 Although the USSR was still at the centre of ONA studies and US strategic planning at the time, the report noted that a multipolar world order was emerging and Asia was becoming increasingly important. The ONA’s recognition of such changes is also evident in subsequent studies, such as Multipolarity in the Pacific by 2010: A Geopolitical Simulation and An Examination of the Implications of Multi-Polarity in Strategy and Force Structure.15
Redefining strategic objectives
Although the ONA recognised the emergence of a multipolar world order in the 1980s, it was the great changes caused by the end of the Cold War that led it to drastically reassess prevailing ideas about national interests and strategies. Soon after the collapse of the USSR, net assessors acknowledged that the United States was not directly threatened and no longer had a peer competitor. As a 1994 ONA-sponsored study pointed out, ‘current U.S. statements of objectives and strategy are either overly specific or vague because they are in transition from the well-defined problems of the Cold War to a new, relatively undefined set of problems’.16 According to the 1993–99 US National Security Surveys, ‘a primary characteristic of the Cold War was that it really was very stable … It provided a beacon for orientation. There is no beacon right now.’17
The ONA’s search for such a beacon led to the redefined strategic objectives and conception of global security proposed in Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999. Written by, among others, Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, later Cheney’s chief of staff, under the supervision of future US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the document discussed the United States’ new position as the world’s only superpower. It also reviewed other nations’ capacity to develop strategic aims and defence postures to challenge this status. The plan clearly defined new strategic objectives as preventing ‘the re-emergence of a new rival for world power’ and addressing ‘sources of regional conflict and instability’ that could unsettle international relations by threatening the interests of the United States or its allies.18
Despite its aims, the study neither identified the United States’ regional focus nor its potential rivals. It suggested that the main US objective in Asia was ‘to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon’.19 While it supported European integration, a Europe that excluded the United States was judged to be unacceptable. The study also presented India as a potential regional hegemon, recommending that the United States ‘discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean’.20
The ONA worked to identify potential threats and adversaries throughout the early 1990s but there is no evidence that it focused on a specific region or adversary until the middle of the decade. In 1992 Marshall instructed his military assistant Andrew F. Krepinevich to assess other nations’ potential to initiate an RMA. Krepinevich compared the global security environment of the time with that of the early 1920s in the belief that no major enemy had emerged. His report intended to identify the most important actors in the following two decades but concluded that the most capable potential rivals were US allies, who had no strong incentive to compete. (Russia had an incentive to compete but was in no position to do so.)
ONA-sponsored studies conducted in the mid-1990s such as Research Design for Asia Force Assessment and Asian Security Challenges: Planning in the Face of Strategic Uncertainties revealed Asia’s enormous strategic and economic significance. Unlike The Future Security Environment, which suggested the region’s relative importance would moderately increase, these studies argued that it would become more important than Europe in subsequent decades. From 1993–98, the ONA conducted various RMA-oriented war games, workshops, roundtables and seminars. East Asia dominated its regional studies. Among the 13 papers the office produced in this period, three focused on China, six on Korean unification and one on wider Asia.21 Asia 2025, which was published in 1999, succinctly explained the reason for this change: ‘most US military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital US interests. The threats are in Asia.’22
Peer competitors
The ONA’s advocacy of a shift of attention from Europe to Asia was based on the assumption that a peer competitor to the United States would eventually emerge from the East.23 Asian Security Challenges envisioned four distinct versions of the future security environment in the region, including a scenario in which ‘the major challenge to U.S. security interests came from the regional hegemonic ambitions of one or more large Asian states: China, Russia, Japan or India.’24
During the latter half of the decade, the ONA conducted many in-depth assessments of these countries to identify which was most likely to become a peer competitor. It analysed their strategic objectives, wider aims, willingness to challenge US supremacy and long-term trends in economics, demography and military capability. It also undertook various projects to assess the future balance of power in Asia by comparing Asian countries’ efforts and abilities to create and adapt to new military technologies.25 Marshall was one of the few defence analysts to recognise China’s economic potential in the 1980s: he predicted the country would develop the world’s largest economy in 25–30 years. In 1994 Marshall argued that ‘there may be six or eight major powers, but the two that have the biggest chance of becoming major competitors are a revived Russia that partially reconstructs its empire, and China.’26 Marshall’s net assessors did continue to study other scenarios. This was in line with his oft-repeated lesson to ONA staff: ‘don’t try to make your best guess. Don’t try to say, this is what’s going to happen, I’m pretty sure, and then suppress dissent, suppress other scenarios that might unfold, or imply that you sort of have a know-it-all attitude.’27
In the early 1990s, for example, many net assessors judged that Japan’s economic power and technological development made it a promising candidate to initiate a future RMA and challenge the United States. Asian Security Challenges argued that
Japan’s technology, manufacturing capabilities, manpower skills, communications, and transportation nets would enable it to make a major increase in its military capabilities, if it decided to do so and was able to overcome the domestic political barriers to becoming a military power ... Japan has the resources to become the dominant military power in Asia and even to become a global military power.28
The 1991 study Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy points out that ‘Asian leaders – notably in Japan – resented the notion that American leaders would arrogate to themselves the right to make decisions and take actions in the name of the greater good of a broadly defined Western world (including the advanced economies of Asia)’.29 However, Japan’s Potential Role in a Military-Technical Revolution, published later that year, concluded that the country showed no interest in re-militarisation: ‘Two strong impressions came out of interviews. First, the pacifist sentiment in Japan was even stronger than we had imagined from our previous readings and experience. Second, tactical-technical innovation is weak and, as far as we could discover, almost non-existent.’30 Moreover, the stagnation of the Japanese economy made it unlikely that Japan would become a peer competitor.
During this period, net assessors maintained that Russia’s military capability, notwithstanding formidable weapons systems and advanced technological expertise, was being severely eroded by economic difficulties and a demographic crisis. Moscow’s defence budget was rapidly diminishing; the Russian state had ‘consistently had problems meeting budget commitments due to tax shortfalls’. The country’s negative population growth had reduced its military-age population.31 This demographic crisis was serious enough that, from the mid-1990s, net assessors grew concerned that China might exploit it by populating Russia’s eastern territories or invading Siberia.32 They also argued that Russia’s sophisticated research and development infrastructure would be undercut by long-term economic decline.
The ONA identified China rather than India as the United States’ principle adversary for several reasons. Firstly, it seems net assessors could not agree whether India should be considered as a potential niche competitor or peer competitor.33 The key difference between these categories is that niche competitors do not threaten the United States’ vital interests, while peer competitors have the potential to challenge its global dominance. Secondly, even if both countries were considered to be potential peer competitors, China would rise more quickly in the short term. Published in 1996, the ONAsponsored study China and India, 2025: A Comparative Assessment concluded that China had more potential for growth before 2025, but India was likely to become more powerful thereafter.34 One scenario explored in Asia 2025 suggested that the United States needed to establish ‘a working strategic dialogue and common geopolitical objectives with one of them, and India appears to be the more logical choice’.35 In April 2000, Marshall suggested this strategy to Donald Rumsfeld, who would be appointed US defence secretary in January 2001, arguing that the United States needed to ‘get interested in India and Australia, and develop better relationships’.36 Marshall confirmed his support for this approach in a discussion about the creation of an Asian equivalent to NATO with high-level Indian civilian advisers in 2003.37
China as the principle competitor
The ONA judged China to be the United States’ main competitor by assessing its capabilities and intentions, which it continues to carefully monitor. A large population with a relatively high literacy rate provides China with the skilled labour necessary for military modernisation and an RMA. The percentage of China’s population at working age will be higher than that of India until 2030, when the trend reverses.38 Marshall started thinking about China as a potential threat to American primacy when its economy, which has been growing rapidly since 1978, was smaller than that of Italy. He suggested that its rapid economic expansion would allow it to increase its military capability and diplomatic influence in Asia and other regions, such as Africa and Latin America.
China’s military is larger, and being modernised more quickly, than that of any other Asian country. The Americans feared that its growing anti-access and area-denial capabilities would enable it to coerce its neighbours and gradually displace US influence in the region. In the mid-1990s, China’s economic development allowed it to significantly increase defence spending and modernisation programmes, and to initiate an RMA. Since then, Marshall has commissioned studies on the country’s military development, power-projection capabilities, changes to its operational doctrine, perception of the future security environment, approach to warfare and RMA.39 In the 1994 China in the Near Term, net assessors contended that the 1991 US invasion of Iraq in Operation Desert Storm fundamentally altered Chinese perceptions of future warfare and fuelled the PLA’s modernisation efforts.40 In 2005 the late Mary C. FitzGerald, research fellow at the Hudson Institute, warned that China had moved towards an RMA by developing weaponry and improving its military theory, organisation, education and training.41She argued that
information, naval and, above all, aerospace [capabilities] still constitute the nucleus of the new revolution in military affairs. If we neglect the timely development of weaponry in these arenas, then China could catch America like a deer in the proverbial headlights, precisely where we caught them after the 1991 victory in Desert Storm.42
During the 1990s, the balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific gradually shifted to benefit China. The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation considerably eased Sino-Russian territorial disputes and allowed China to focus on other contended areas, such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In response to the PLA’s demonstration of force in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States assisted Taiwan by providing it with analytical training through the ONA and helping it to develop its defence capabilities.43
In 2000 Marshall argued that ‘the PRC is ambitious. Its goal is to be a great power.’44 Such a view was also evident in China in the Near Term, which concluded that China’s long-term strategic goal was to develop a military that rivalled the United States globally.45 The report argued that China was dissatisfied with the US-dominated world order and its foreign policies were ‘independent of and sometimes opposed to U.S. policies’, which created ‘the potential for China directly to challenge U.S. security interests’.46 The Pentagon-sponsored The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications, published in 1999, used realist theory and an analysis of Chinese history to argue that China would seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific as its power grew.47 As FitzGerald put it in 2005, ‘China’s ultimate objective is to achieve global military-economic dominance by 2050’.48
Marshall laid out the blueprint for the pivot in a memo to Rumsfeld in May 2002:
Australia: start negotiations to base selected US forces in Australian Northern Territories and expand US and regional states’ use of Australian training ranges … India: increase port visits, and initiate program of mil-to-mil interactions; initiate joint planning for contingency of loss of control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan … Initiate planning for a major expansion of basing infrastructure in Guam, and possible improvement in Pearl Harbor infrastructure … Direct the Services to plan for the types of military challenges a malevolent China may pose over the long-term, and incorporate these into Service and Joint war games, training and exercise programs, including routine wide-area USN–USAF–special forces exercises … For next UCP change (GWOT permitting), redraw CENTCOM/PACOM boundaries to reflect China as principle long-term strategic competitor.49
The memo makes clear that despite China’s comparative lack of development in many areas, the ONA had identified it as the biggest threat to US primacy over the next few decades. As Aaron L. Friedberg, professor at Princeton University, has argued, ‘China today appears to have both the “will” and the “wallet” to compete actively with the United States for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world’.50
Preserving US primacy through competition with China
Net assessors usually suggest that the United States has three ways to meet the challenges of a rising China.51 It could either forego its current primacy by reducing its global presence and reverting to isolationism, create a multipolar world order in which other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their regions or preserve its current position by limiting China’s growing power and influence.52
Several ONA studies in the early 2000s addressed the difficulties of preserving or extending US primacy.53 Although net assessors acknowledge that the United States’ relative power will decline in coming decades, they often argue that it can preserve its current role. In the face of challenges from emerging powers, history suggests that a dominant state can preserve or strengthen its primacy. Friedberg has argued that the United States may be able to maintain its position for at least a few decades.54 The 2002 ONA paper Military Advantage in History uses case studies of dominant ancient powers to argue that superior armed forces are vital to the preservation of great power status:
The Roman model suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop countercapabilities. Transformation coupled with strong strategic institutions is a powerful combination for an adversary to overcome.55
The paper therefore suggests that the United States needed to initiate an RMA to adapt to the changing security environment, especially the asymmetric challenges posed by China.
Having confirmed that maintaining US primacy was possible, Marshall devised a strategy for competing with China that focused on dissuasion, deterrence and defeat. This approach was officially introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and reiterated in later documents. The strategy accords with Marshall’s view that ‘any adequate balance assessment requires evaluation from at least three perspectives: deterrence, likely war outcomes, and long-term competition in peacetime’.56
Dissuasion, deterrence and defeat
Net assessors argue that dissuasion is crucial to long-term peacetime competition. Marshall suggests the United States’ strategic goal ‘should be to delay the emergence of hostile and competent competitors’.57 This objective could be achieved by dissuading China from further developing its military or expanding globally. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report proposed that
through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.58
Although the concept of dissuasion was only officially introduced in 2001, the ONA has studied the idea for much longer. In 1992 Krepinevich stated ‘there are ways in which the United States could shape the competition, or dissuade or deter competitors’.59 Today, dissuasion and deterrence appear to be very similar. Dissuasion Strategy, a 2008 study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, defined dissuasion as ‘pre-deterrence’ or ‘actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated costs and/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing, expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening or otherwise undesirable from the US perspective’.60 Stephen P. Rosen, professor at Harvard University, has explained the logic of long-term peaceful competition:
By understanding the fears and sensitivities of an adversary, programs could be initiated or reinforced in ways that reduced the confidence of the adversary in his ability to win an engagement or a war. This could enhance deterrence, and also lead the adversary to cease its efforts even to compete with the United States in certain areas.61
The United States may dissuade potential competitors by occasionally demonstrating its military capabilities and willingness to enter into a conflict, but dissuasion is a very delicate matter. An excessive demonstration of force and willingness to fight could prompt greater Chinese assertiveness。
This suggests that to determine the correct use of the strategy, the Pentagon will closely monitor China’s perception of, and responses to, dissuasive action. The success of such a strategy depends more on the Chinese reaction to dissuasive demonstrations of power than the actual capabilities of US forces. Where China’s view of US military superiority has made it less likely to develop capabilities to challenge the United States, dissuasion has succeeded. This recognition of the importance of perceptions has led to many studies of human cognition, the biological mechanisms of decision-making and Chinese culture, strategic traditions and leadership ideology.62
In the last 10–15 years, the ONA has focused on strategic dissuasion. The office views China’s development of capabilities as being in its early stages, but having great potential to challenge US primacy in the long term. The ONA also concludes that, should both dissuasion and deterrence fail, the United States must be prepared to defeat China. The likely outcomes of such a conflict, and whether it would serve US interests in the long term, are unclear. The ONA’s usual method of gathering experts from relevant areas to create a range of plausible scenarios is insufficient for predicting how a war between the United States and China would play out, even in terms of assessing the likelihood of achieving military objectives. Qualitative factors, such as doctrine and operational concepts, are vital to determining the results of such a war. The development of new weapons technologies and operational concepts could serve the strategies of dissuasion, deterrence and defeat because it may enable the United States to prevail in future conflicts and discourage potential adversaries from attacking US interests.63
Assessing China
Since 2000, the ONA appears to have made significant progress in creating strategies for long-term competition with China. As the office increased its efforts to understand the long-term consequences of China’s rise, it undertook a series of analyses of the country’s economy; military capabilities and modernisation; potential economic and political influence in the region and perception of the security environment.64 The ONA often conducted war games designed to assess how US and Chinese forces might interact, including through the office’s annual summer studies programme at the US Naval War College.
During this period, many other US organisations, especially ONArelated think tanks, worked to assess China. Analytical tools developed by the office were often used to simulate Sino-American conflicts.65 In recent years, the ONA has organised many seminars and workshops on net assessment, competitive strategies and case studies focusing on China, including a 2010 conference that produced the book Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Such developments suggest the office has accepted the United States will enter into long-term competition with China, and has made the application of Cold War analytical and strategic methods central to its work. It is likely that the ONA seeks to identify China’s strengths and weaknesses, how to best use US power against Chinese vulnerabilities and the forms of competition that most favour the United States. For example, if the office judges that China fears containment, it may formulate strategies to exploit this perception.
* * *
A study of the ONA’s work suggests that the United States’ pivot towards Asia has been a gradual process. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the office’s progressive shift of focus from the Soviet Union to competition with China was based on long-term assessments of the security environment and the development of potential emerging powers. It also suggests that the Pentagon began a detailed assessment of Chinese strengths and weaknesses in the early 2000s. In recent years, ONA studies have attempted to outline a strategy to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities and compete in areas in which the United States is strong, with the goal of preserving US primacy. If the office’s work anticipates US strategy in Asia, the United States may demonstrate its power in highly selective ways that aim to dissuade China from challenging its dominance. It is likely that Cold War competitive strategies will be a significant part of the Pentagon’s approach to China in coming decades.
Notes
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